. is paper provides quantitative evidence of the protectionist measures implemented by three groups of countries: the European Union, NAFTA and BRICS in the aftermath of the last nancial crisis. is article reveals that both emerging economies and highly-industrialized countries were very active in introducing discrimination measures against foreign commercial interests; however the dominated forms of protectionist actions were not traditional ones (border measures), but behind-the-border barriers. Furthermore, in the post-crisis era, the majority of protectionist actions took illegible form and were implemented not only towards the third countries but also among the members of free trade-based organization like the EU or NAFTA.
INTRODUCTION
According to the conventional approach to foreign trade policy big trade collapse induces protectionist actions. It implies that protectionism is counter-cyclical. e consequences of the last nancial crisis, which have spread to the global economy and triggered long-lasting slowdowns, bolstered a threat of introduction of new protectionism measures. A strong conviction about a return to protectionism induced some economists to monitor government's actions and verify their compliance with the pledges made in the framework of the World Trade Organization or other institutional entities like the European Union (EU).
e traditional approach to protectionism based on stylized facts also suggests a stronger resort to trade discrimination in the case of developing and emerging economies with high level of openness. e objective of this paper is to examine the scale and forms of protectionist actions undertaken in the post-crisis era by three groups of countries: the BRICS which represents emerging economies (Brazil, Russia, India, South Africa), the EU and the NAFTA (the USA, Canada, Mexico), which in majority embrace advanced economies. Total share of the chosen economies in the world trade is signi cant and amounted to 63% in exports and 65% in global imports. e main source of data analysed in the paper come from the Global Trade Alert initiative a liated with the Centre of Economic Policy Research (CEPR). e article revealed that not only emerging countries, but also governments of high-industrialized economies, were very active in implemen-tation of discrimination measures against foreign commercial interests in the aftermath of the last nancial crisis. However, their activities were very often 'behind-the-border' which meant that protectionism took an illegible form and it became di cult to monitor and measure. e article also presents classi cation of 'behind-the-border' protectionist measures and tries to rede ne the term of economic protectionism in the context of modern discrimination actions undertaken after the last global nancial crisis.
is paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the scale of trade collapse in the world economy in 2009. is phenomenon is described with respect to long-term tendencies in international trade ows. Section II analyses the volume and scope of trade-policy measures implemented in the post-crisis era. It examines character of the measures and a ected trading partners. Section IV focuses on forms of protectionist instruments including tari , non-tari , border and behind-the-border measures used by the EU, NAFTA and BRICS countries in the aftermath of the last global crisis. Section V concludes with implication of further areas of research.
A SUDDEN TRADE COLLAPSE AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008
Since the 1980s, a distinct long-term trend of increase in the level of trade openness can be clearly identi ed in the world economy. Trade openness can be calculated as a sum of exports and imports as a percentage of nominal gross domestic product (GDP) 1 . Figure 1 shows the annual data for the world economy with di erentiation between developing and developed economies. In 1980 developing countries registered a sum of exports and imports in relation to GDP at 50% whereas a level of openness of developed countries was 40%. Up to 2008 trade openness has increased respectively to 79% and 56%. e last nancial crisis, which caused a 'Great Recession' on a global scale, reduced not only production but also volume of exports and imports in the vast majority of economies. A collapse of trade ows exceeded a decline of output in both groups of countries so the indicators of trade openness for the majority of economies abruptly diminished in 2009 (see gure 1).
A quick recovery in international trade occurred in 2010 and 2011, but in 2012 and 2013 trade growth was sluggish. Figure 2 shows growth rates of merchandise exports and imports in three groups of countries: BRICS, EU and NAFTA. After a sudden bust in 2009 when world exports shrank by 22% compared to the level of the previous year, exports of BRICS countries grew by 36% in 2010. Rates of export growth in 2010 were also high in EU and NAFTA, respectively 12% and 22%. ese data re ect the general trend of international trade recovery because in 2010 exports of developing countries grew by around 29% and 16% in the case of developed economies. Annual growth rates of imports in 2010 were even higher and amounted to 30% in developing countries and 17% in developed economies. Rapid recovery of international trade continued in 2011 but in 2012 and 2013 the growth rates of exports and imports were either negative or very small (see gure 2). It is worth noting that after the 'Great Recession' as well as before the last crisis, emerging economies, including BRICS countries, registered signi cantly higher rates of export growth compared to the EU and the NAFTA countries. is phenomenon can be explained by the strong position of emerging economies in the global-value-chain production system.
One of the consequences of the last global crisis was a change of shares of particular countries in the world trade. Figure 3 shows that the international positions of the EU and NAFTA countries have steadily weakened since 2004 whereas the share of BRICS countries in the world exports increased to 18% in 2013.
ese tendencies re ect the long-term loss of competitiveness of the EU and NAFTA countries and the gain in the upper position in international trade by emerging markets 2 . e above characteristics imply that in the face of the 'Great Recession' and the global trade slump developed countries could have resorted to trade barriers even more than developing economies. e global crisis provoked not only the sudden fall of exports (negative external shock), but also roughly restrained import purchases. is implied that the nal e ects for trade balance was ambiguous. In 2009 the majority of economies registered a deterioration in their trade balances (e.g. China, Russian Fed., Brazil, Canada) but some economies (e.g. USA, Mexico) reduced their trade de cits or even increased surpluses (e.g. the EU as a whole). Figure 4 presents trade balances as percentage of GDP for countries of BRICS, the EU (as a whole) and the NAFTA. In the case of countries, which in 2009 were severely hit by negative demand shock and su ered from the loss of international competitiveness, trade imbalances could act as a spur to introduce protectionist measures.
THE SCALE AND SCOPE OF PROTECTIONIST MEASURES IMPLEMENTED IN THE POSTCRISIS ERA
Since the last global economic crisis outbreak, many governments have implemented di erent measures to deal with the consequences of the slowdown and to stimulate their economies. Trade policy was one of the dynamic areas of government activities. Figure 5 shows that in the case of all three analysed groups of countries (EU, NAFTA and BRICS) the number of trade restrictiveness measures signi cantly exceeded the number of trade liberal or neutral actions. Figure 5 indicates that the number of harmful measures which are classi ed by the Global Trade Alert as 'red' or 'amber' 3 implemented by the BRICS countries was the highest (781) among the considered bloc countries, whereas in the NAFTA economies had the lowest (292). Taking into consideration trade-liberal or trade-neutral measures 4 , net result is negative for all three groups of countries, however the number of harmful measures as a percentage of total implemented measures by each group is the highest for the EU countries -amounting to 86% (see gure 5), whereas for BRICS countries it amounts to 67% and for NAFTA economies to 64%. ese results indicate that the EU countries trade actions in the post-crisis era were the most restrictive compared to other analysed groups of countries. Another interesting phenomenon concerning the scale and scope of protectionism refers to trading partners a ected by trade-discriminating measures implemented by the countries belonging to the considered three groups. In particular the question arises whether protectionist actions have been applied mainly towards the third countries (outside the group) or whether they were used also against other members of the bloc. is issue is particularly related to free trade agreement set between Canada, Mexico and the USA, as well as to the EU countries operating in a common market. e BRICS countries have not established any formal agreement of economic cooperation, nevertheless they were involved in the research. Data in table 1 revealed that in terms of the number of times that commercial interests have been discriminated against, China is listed at the top by all considered jurisdictions. In the case of BRICS countries, India and Russia were particularly active in implementing trade measures against Chinese commercial interest. Foreign protectionist measures have been also very often used against the USA market agents. According to the data presented in table 1, the USA was listed at the second position in the ranking of economies the most frequently a ected by protectionism measures applied by both the EU and the NAFTA countries. It is surprising that two of the NAFTA member economies, the USA and Mexico, were ranked respectively on the second and third position in the top-10 list of economies harmed by the NAFTA countries 5 . is means that the commitments to avoid protectionism made by the members of free trade area were not ful lled, although article 102 of the NAFTA declaration stipulates that ' e objectives of this Agreement, as elaborated more speci cally through its principles and rules, including national treatment, most-favored-nation treatment and transparency, are to: a) It is worth noting that the weakness of ful lling the pledges to free trade rules refers also to the EU countries. As table 1 shows Germany, France, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain are positioned at the top-10 list of trading partners a ected by the EU countries. e fact that so many EU members were discriminated against by other Common Market economies implies the possibility of circumvention of the binding free-trade regulations. ese rules are set in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), part III Union Policies and Internal Actions. Although the above cited articles regulate the common trade policy, they mainly refer to trade barriers, so in the post-crisis era, the EU members used mainly behind-the-border protectionist measures.
FORMS OF PROTECTIONIST MEASURES IMPLEMENTED BY THE EU, NAFTA AND BRICS COUNTRIES AFTER 2008
As during the two decades preceding the crisis many countries made e orts to eliminate trade barriers (mainly tari s), and the range of trade defence measures seemed to be limited for those who wanted to ful l their treaty pledges. Nevertheless, protectionist actions undertaken in the aftermath of the crisis were rich in implementing new export-led-growth and import impediment measures. It is worth noting that the forms of implemented protectionist measures di ered among the analysed economies but in all three groups nontari instruments distinctly dominated over the tari measures. As gure 6 shows the EU countries which according to customs union rules have common trade tari s and for the two last decades have been very active in promoting trade liberalization increased tari s only three times, what constituted around 1% of all restrictive measures implemented by the EU economies. e NAFTA countries were also muted in using tari s (7% of all protectionist measures). However, for the BRICS countries, tari s were the most popular protectionist instruments, as they amounted to 19% of total protectionist measures implemented by the countries of this group (see gure 6 and gure 9). e reason for this refers to the fact that many developing countries did not participate in o cial tari cutting in the post-war GATT rounds. eir late involvement to multilateral liberalization process made their tari level higher comparing with advanced economies. e point is that as developing countries have negotiated with the WTO higher bound tari s -i.e. the tari ceilings, their applied tari s could rise up to the bound level without o ending the WTO obligations. For example, Brazil has negotiated nal bound tari rates at 31,4
6 whereas the applied tari rates in 2012 amounted to 13,5. In the case of India bound tari s were set at 48,6, whereas the applied tari s for all goods amounted to 13,7. It is worth noting that the nal bound tari s for agriculture goods were negotiated at 113,1 and tari s actually imposed by India reached 34,4. e bound rates for advanced economies as well as the level of applied tari s by this group of countries were signi cantly lower. For example, the bound tari s in the USA and Canada were set at 3,5 and 6,9, whereas the actually charged duties amounted in 2012 respectively to 3,4 and 4,3. For the EU countries the average of applied import duties exceeded by 0,3 p.p. the bound level set at 5,2 (WTO, 2014). As it can be easily noticed not only tari level but also the di erences between the bound and applied tari s are distinctly lower in advanced economies than in developing countries. is restricts developed economies to increasing the import duty rates.
At the beginning of the post-crisis era the majority of researchers trying to explain trade barriers' impact on the trade collapse in 2009 de ned protectionism as border measures such as tari s, quotas, import bans and export taxes (Bown, Crowley 2012; Knee, Neagu, Nicita 2013). e reason for a common use of boarder measures to assess the role of protectionism on international trade collapse was due to limitations of behind-the-border data. With time more and more economists admitted that other policy measures, such as government bailouts, buy-national requirements, public procurement or technical standards could play a much larger role than tari s and antidumping duties in a ecting trade during the last nancial crisis (Evenett, Vines 2012; Baldwin, Evenett 2012; Kee, Neagu, Nicita 2013) . Great economic signi cance of non-tari barriers was con rmed also by WTO, UNCTAD, OECD, as well as political initiatives like G-20 summits which at the height of the crisis started to discuss and monitor protectionist and discrimination actions undertaken as a reaction to a global crisis. eir initiatives were new with respect to examining some of the policy instruments as behind-the-border measures.
Behind the border barriers refers to a variety of non-tari barriers that operate inside countries rather than at the border, but that nonetheless can restrict or discriminate trade. Examples include technical barriers to trade, subsidies to exporters, administrative regulations concerning public procurement, sanitary and phytosanitary regulations as well as so called 'green protectionism' measures. It is worth noting that behind-the-border measures are related to requirements and regulations imposed before export dispatch or import purchase and they often concern either intangible products or services which do not pass the border. Baldwin, Evenett and Low (2007) list six areas of behind-the-border measures: trade in services, government procurement, competition policy, investment performance measures, technical barriers to trade, and trade remedies. It should be underlined that the term 'non-tari measures' is broader than 'behind the border barriers' because the former one alters the conditions of international trade, including ones that act to increase trade as well as those that restrict it whereas the previous one mainly impedes trade. However, the two are sometimes used interchangeably, e.g. anti-dumping duties which generally are classi ed as border measures can be treated as non-border barriers because as Staiger (2012, p. 8) Figures 7, 8 and 9 present number of speci ed protectionist measures implemented by the EU, NAFTA and BRICS countries with regard to three groups of protectionist measures: tari s, non-tari border measures and behind-the-border instruments. Border measures comprise: anti-dumping duties (AD), countervailing duties, safeguards, quotas and import bans. e list of behind-the-border measures is longer and includes among others: bail out/state aid measures, public procurement, trade nance, export subsidies, investment and migration measures and local content requirements. As shown, tari s were not popular trade defence instrument, except the BRICS countries. In all considered three groups of countries non-tari instruments distinctly exceeded the number of traditional tari s measures. Furthermore, the EU, NAFTA and BRICS countries used particularly often such behind-the-border measures like bail-out/state aid. In the case of the EU and NAFTA, migration restraints were ranked on the second position, whereas for BRICS countries they were not the primary protectionist instruments. Total number of behind-the-border measures amounted to 428 for the BRICS countries, 237 for the EU countries and 85 for the NAFTA economies. ese results exceeded the non-tari border measures which amounted respectively to 272, 63 and 60.
CONCLUSIONS
e decline of the volume of world international trade in 2009 as well as a time-lag recovery of global output increased threat of a return to protectionist measures. e aim of this paper was to evaluate the scale and scope of protectionist measures implemented by three groups of countries (the EU, NAFTA and BRICS) in the aftermath of the last nancial crisis. e key results revealed that both developing and developed countries have implemented new protectionist measures since 2008. However, to not o end against o cial pledges declared in the framework of bilateral or multilateral agreements, the majority of examined countries resorted rather to behind-the-border measures. Baldwin and Evenett (2009) called this a 'murky protectionism'.
With respect to the forms of behind-the-border measures, bail-out and state aid were the most often used instruments, whereas anti-dumping duties (AD), countervailing duties and safeguards dominated as border but non-tari measures. Tari s constituted only 1% of all restrictive measures implemented by the EU economies and 7% in the case of the NAFTA countries. However, for the BRICS countries tari s amounted to 19% of total number of protectionist instruments implemented by this group. is was due to quite a lot of leeway, which was allowed to many developing countries according to the WTO negotiation rules. e point is that as developing countries have negotiated with the WTO higher than advanced economies bound tari s-i.e. the tari ceilings, their de facto applied tari s could rise up to the bound level without o ending the WTO obligations.
In terms of trading partner a ected, China tops the list of the countries the most often harmed by all of the examined jurisdictions. Another nding is that protectionist measures were often implemented against commercial interest of other members of the examined groups, e.g. among the EU or NAFTA members. ese facts proved that despite free trade agreements and common market rules the governments left space for circumvention of the binding free-trade regulations. e wide range of behind-the-border measures including public procurement or safety standards very often refer to intangible goods and services what makes them less transparent and di cult to quantify. at is why the economist tried to construct new indicators of protectionism comprising non-direct measures which could better inform discriminating actions and help to deter the countries form beggar-thy-neighbour acts.
